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What follows is an account of the Sri Lanka state at present. I would like to characterise the present Sri Lankan state as a post-war state. In 2009 the military strategy started in 1979 succeeded in consolidating the territory of the centralised state after 30 years. Prior to that it was a fractured state. It did not fully control the war-affected areas in the North and East. The central state could not carry out the basic functions of a state such as a regular census. The censuses in 1991 and 2001 did not cover the entire island.

This area had land where capitalist exploitation could not be extended. The strategically important Trincomalee harbour was also located here.

Several factors helped the success of the military operations. The regime in power improved the strength of the armed forces and increased the defence budget. The centralised state secured military hardware from number of foreign sources. China, Pakistan, India, Israel, Ukraine, Russia and the US were important sources. Other suppliers included some EU countries.[1]

On top of that, key foreign powers influential in Sri Lanka wanted to see the end of the conflict and the LTTE because of their own strategic interests. In this regard the most important country was the regional power, India. In June 1987 India intervened to stop a military operation of the state that resulted in the Indo-Lankan Accord. This time India had no such interest. The LTTE politics had alienated the support of the Indian state. US imperialist policies, which by this time focused on a fight against what was called terrorism at global level, adopted a similar position. In a speech to the American Chamber of Commerce, the US Ambassador made it clear that it was supporting the military efforts of the Sri Lankan state.[2] By this time the EU has also categorised the LTTE as a terrorist organisation.

A new development was an improvement in the relationship between the state and China and military support from China. This was a revival of an old relationship with China. The post-colonial state always accepted the One China policy, recognising only the People’s Republic of China. When the state faced a foreign exchange crisis in the 1950s, the Rubber-Rice agreement signed with China provided rice below world market prices. When Sri Lanka hosted the non-aligned summit, China donated a conference centre. When the US cut off foreign aid to the state in 1962 because of nationalisation of US oil companies, foreign aid from China began to play an important role. During the post-1977 period, when relations between developed capitalist countries of the West and Japan became dominant, relations with China became less important. But with Chinese support to military operations for the consolidation of the territory of the centralised state, the relations with China improved.

Military operations were not concerned about civilian casualties. They resulted in heavy civilian costs and mass graves. With this event the state became yet another example in the world where the territory of a state was consolidated through military means with heavy civilian costs. Close to 300,000 people were trapped in an ever-shrinking area during the last stages of the military operations. The report of the Panel of Experts appointed by the UN Secretary General estimated that around 40,000 civilians were killed during the last stages of the war and the state committed war crimes.[3]

UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Navi Pillay reacted to what was happening within the state during military operations. In the middle of the military operations the High Commissioner issued a statement indicating that the military actions of both parties were violating international human rights and humanitarian laws. After the war ended, she visited the North and met people affected by the war and got a first-hand account of what had happened during the last stages of the war. The ultimate outcome with these concerns within the UN system was the US sponsoring a resolution at the UN Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) in March 2014. The most challenging element in the resolution for the post-war Sri Lankan state was the call for an international inquiry into what happened during the last stages of the war.

In trying to understand what has been the real political outcome of this resolution, the first question to ask why did the US, which supported the military operations, sponsor such a resolution? It is always necessary to distinguish between the politics of human rights advocated by countervailing political forces and by states. When states utilise human rights in relation to other states, their strategic interests always play a role. The same political interests operate in their behaviour within the UN system. It should be clear by now that the main reason why the US sponsored this resolution was to counter the growing influence of China with the Sri Lankan state.

When a more pro-Western regime came to power in 2015, the regime co-sponsored with the US a new version of the UNHRC resolution. The text was almost the same as the 2014 resolution with one key change. The section on having a war crimes investigation by international judges was replaced by a Sri Lankan one, with technical support from international sources. In other words, the state promised to appoint its own mechanism to inquire into war crimes. After more than a decade it is not clear whether this resolution will ever lead to punishing those responsible for war crimes. In addition, in the current global context the more right wing regime in the US has undermined UN mechanisms.  It is doubtful whether UN mechanisms will ever succeed in making the state accountable for war crimes.

Whatever happens with international actors, it is the duty of more progressive researchers to record the social costs of the last stages of the military operations for those who lived in the conflict-affected areas. This is necessary so that future generations will have better idea of the history of the state. This needs to take a comprehensive look at village level. For example, taking a sample of villages, tracing the history of what happened to people in these villages over three decades and placing the current situation in this context will give a better picture of the various dimensions of suffering they have faced. This will raise fundamental questions about what it means to return to “normalcy” for a population whose lives have been affected by an armed conflict for so many years.

Once the territory of the centralised state had been consolidated through military means with a significant loss of lives of citizens, several steps were taken to ensure the security of the post-war state. Foreign powers played a key role in some of these steps.

The first was to reconnect the areas that had come under the centralised state with the centre of power in Colombo. This was necessary both for security purposes and to spread capitalist exploitation especially on land in these areas. Two projects – Neganahira Udanaya (Eastern Revival) and Uthuru Vasanthaya (Northern Spring) – played an important role in this. Both titles of the projects were in Sinhala. They had an ideological connotation. They implied a new beginning to these areas. The state secured foreign aid for this purpose. Most of the funding came from two multilaterals. An estimate of foreign aid disbursements for 2009 shows that around 60 percent of foreign aid was for infrastructure development in these areas.[4]

The second element of the security of the post-war state was continuation of the strength of the armed forces. A by-product of three decades of armed conflict was a larger security sector. According to what is called functional classification of government expenditure by the Central Bank, defence and public order accounted for 12.1 percent of public expenditure in 2018. The year 2018 is chosen because this was the year preceding several events that ultimately led to the post-war state defaulting on re-payment of loans due to global financial capitalism. Along with maintaining the strength of the armed forces. The post-war state continued to maintain the discourse of terrorism and the 1979 PTA to support the coercive capacity of the state. This was supplemented by a continued presence of a larger military force in the Northern Province, the heartland of Tamil nationalism. This security force is materially and symbolically linked to the centralised state.

The last element for ensuring the security of the post-war state was promoting the ideology of reconciliation. Many projects supported by foreign aid were also based in this idea. The notion of reconciliation focuses on society, rather than on state-society relations. It assumes that the conflict is one of homogeneous identity groups clashing with each other. Although there is an element of prejudice and animosity between identity groups in Sri Lanka’s conflict, they exist in the context of a centralised state. It ignores the fundamental reasons for conflict in a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. It ignores the need for reform of the state, including its identity, public policies, and institutional structure, to suit a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural society. What Sri Lanka needs is not a nation state with a unified identity but a state that is suited for a plural society. Only if we combine state reforms and changes at the level of the society can we achieve this.

Post-war state and state-minority relations

Although the territory of the centralised state has been consolidated through military means with heavy civilian costs, the post-war state is far from being a plural state suitable for a multi-ethnic and multi-religious society. In discussing this issue in post-war state, we need to take into account not only the interests of Sri Lankan Tamils but also of Muslims and Hill Country Tamils.

The loss of lives and war crimes committed by the centralised state have become a new grievance within the Tamil community. Tamil nationalist politics cannot be understood by confining ourselves within the territory of the state. Overseas Tamils are a part and parcel of Tamil politics. This is a common phenomenon in many struggles of ethnic and religious minorities in the world.

Within the post-war state control of state land, especially in the Northern Province, continues to be a major issue for Tamils. A report from US-based Human Rights Watch in 2018 pointed out some of the key issues.[5] These included army occupation of land, land being taken over by institutions of the central state and private land grabbing. More recently a report published by the Centre for Policy Alternatives covered the same question.[6] As in the past, Buddhism continues be a tool used by the Buddhist majority for special rights over land in the Northern and Eastern Provinces.

Within the post-war state the Muslim community has been at the receiving end of prejudice and violence. Prejudice against Muslims, which has always been there, has become more overt. Anti-Muslim sentiments have become a global phenomenon, especially in Western countries. Its impact is seen within the post-war Sri Lankan state as well. The suicide attacks on two Christian churches on Easter Sunday in 2019 resulted in a qualitative shift in anti-Muslim sentiments. This was an act of extreme forms of Islamic politics that have become a global phenomenon. But the entire Muslim population in the post-war state became a target of prejudice and victims in the use of the coercive power of the state. A significant section of the non-Muslim population perceived the situation through an extreme form of Islamophobic ideology.

When it comes to the Indian Tamil population, although there have been improvements in their socio-economic conditions, there are key outstanding issues. Perhaps the most important one is ownership of their houses. Within plantation capitalism these were called line rooms. The plantation workers could live in them only if they work in plantations. This is an issue that has to be rectified by breaking the link between estates and line rooms and making them permanent settlements for this population.

An important development within this population has been a process of changing identity. Calling themselves Indian Tamils became a problem after they got Sri Lankan citizenship. The term Malaiyaga Makkal or Hill Country Tamils has come into practice, giving them a distinct ethnic identity. Much more work has to be done to recognise this distinct identity. Like other ethnic groups they are not just workers but a population that has their own history and a cultural identity. There is a need for research in this area and activities that will bring recognition to this distinct identity. But the question is how the post-war state will accommodate this new identity.

Post-war capitalist development and relations with the Sinhala majority

The consolidation of the territory of the centralised state through military means with the loss of civilian lives and the end of the armed conflict removed a major problem for capitalist growth.  However, the state became ineligible for concessional foreign aid because of its middle income status. This was a result of the established foreign aid policy of developed capitalist countries of the West right from the beginning of the aid industry after the Second World War. The policy was to confine concessional aid to countries with low income. Foreign aid was supposed to assist these countries in the initial stages of capitalist growth. The stages of economic growth theory legitimised this. According to this theory, foreign aid is needed to achieve what was called take off of capitalist growth. Middle status is an indication of reaching this point. Once this stage is reached concessional aid is reduced and states are supposed to depend on global finance capital for external finance. This means new markets are ensured for global finance capital located in donor countries. However, as happened in many parts of the world, countries with underdeveloped capitalism begin to face many difficulties when they become dependent on global financial capital for external finance.

The dependence of the post-war state on global financial markets rose sharply. Certainly, the fact that the state had been stabilised made it easier to raise funds in global financial markets. Central Bank data shows that, in 2018, 56.1 percent of the ownership of foreign debt was to financial markets.

Once a state becomes dependent on financial markets a completely different type of politics of international economic relations begins to operate. When a state receives foreign aid from bilateral and multilateral donors, the state can negotiate debt issues with these sources.  Of course, in these negotiations each of the donors tries to pursue their own interests. But foreign debt becomes a subject of negotiation. When a state becomes dependent on loans from finance capital, market mechanisms and the interests of finance capital begin to play the dominant role. States where these companies are located use their power to ensure that loans are repaid so that the profitability of finance companies is not affected. The role of the IMF is to ensure that loans are paid and the stability of global financial market is maintained.

When the post-war Sri Lankan state became dependent on financial markets for external finance, managing the budget deficit became more important. But this had to be done within a state that had undergone significant changes in the post-1977 period. First, three decades of armed conflict led to the growth of the armed forces. The post-war state continued to maintain the strength of the armed forces as a security measure. Second, the institutional structure of the state has undergone significant changes. The institutional structure of the post-war state consists of institutions at presidential, parliament, provincial, district, sub-district and local authority levels. Some of these levels have elected members and a bureaucracy. Some only have a bureaucracy to manage them.

The introduction of institutions at provincial and sub-district levels was linked to state reforms as a response to two different types of conflict. Provincial councils were a response to the Tamil demand for devolving power from the central state. Sub-district level institutions were the result of the discourse of decentralisation, which has always been used to manage relations with the Sinhala majority in situations of conflict. In addition, there was a proliferation of institutions at central level in order to maintain coalition cabinets. This was a product of the PR system of elections. Sometimes, in order to satisfy the interests of cabinet members, existing state institutions got divided.

The nature of the structure of the post-war state and its finances can be understood by looking at what the Central Bank calls functional classification of state expenditure. It shows that, in 2018, 49.9 percent of public expenditure went to cover maintenance of the bureaucracy, the security sector and interest payments on loans. In other words, half of government expenditure was to sustain the state and pay interest on loans secured from financial markets.

There are a lot of number crunching exercises that focus on how to manage public finances without looking into the nature of the state. Recent interest in improving the tax base of states has proliferated such analysis. In the case of the post-war state, this discussion has to be linked with the nature of the post-war state. This means there has to be a link between tax issues and state reforms.

In the context of the greater dependence on finance capital of the post-war state, several events affected the external finances. First, the attack by suicide bombers on Easter Sunday shattered the image of the stability of the post-war state. Then there was the spread of Covid-19. During the 2019 presidential elections, the candidate who won promised tax reductions to promote local capital. The worsening budget deficit made it more costly to raise loans on global financial markets, creating a shortage in foreign exchange. The regime in power, due to its ideological position, refused to seek assistance from the IMF. The ultimate outcome was the post-war state suspended loan repayments in 2022. Due to a shortage of foreign exchange, the post-war state could not import some of the basic needs.

The post-war state’s inability to fulfil the demands of global finance capital devastated the lives of millions of its people. This happened in a society showing the socio-economic impact of three decades of armed conflict, and more than four decades of liberal capitalism. The 2019 Household Income and Expenditure Survey, which managed to cover the entire territory of the state because it had been unified through military means, shows that 11.9 percent of households were living below the official poverty line. There was a great degree of variation in this indicator between districts. Colombo District had 1.8 percent of households below the poverty line and in Mullaitivu District in Northern Province it was as high as 39.5 percent of households.[7]

Another important characteristic was a significant increase in inequality. In order to understand the reasons for this we need to look at what happened on land and the fate of the working class under a more liberal form of capitalism. Available data shows that the deepening of capitalist development made smallholder agriculture less economical. In parallel, the importance of wage labour as a means of earning an income increased. With the growth of the working class, education and skills development became more important. But with the expansion of the private sector in education, the better off classes had access to an education that was more useful in a market economy. Even the state education sector has become more unequal. In addition, institutions protecting the working class have been weakened. The overall outcome of this is the emergence of a highly economically unequal society. Data for 2019 shows that, while the richest 20 percent of the population acquired 51.4 percent of national income, the poorest 20 percent had only 4.6 percent.[8]

It is in this context of the impact of more liberal capitalism that the debt crisis and its social impact gave rise to a protest movement, the aragalaya. The politics of the movement combined protests against the contradictions of capitalist growth and dissatisfaction with the political elite who controlled the state. Protestors came from various sections of the population. There were also actions by more organised groups such as trade unions, student organisations and political parties. There was violence associated with the protestors. The most important political outcome of the protests was the resignation of the president. Earlier he was the defence secretary. He had been popular as a Sinhala hero because of his role in military operations. This experience once again shows that politics in Sinhala majority areas cannot be explained by ethnicity alone. The socio-economic contradictions of capitalist transition and attitudes towards ruling regimes play an important role.

The ruling political elite responded to this political event using the coercive power of the state. This was supported by the armed forces of the post-war state and continuity of the PTA. A report by the International Federation of Human Rights mentions use of live ammunition, tear gas and water cannons on protesters, attacks against journalists covering the protest, violent raids on protest camps and detention under the PTA. Along with the use of coercive power of the state, different sections of the political elite came together to stabilise the situation. The political elite secured assistance from the IMF and an agreement was signed in March 2023.

As far as the history of state formation is concerned, this was repetition of a pattern seen earlier. It was another example of the failure to manage the strategic state-society relation between the Sinhala majority and the state in the context of politics of capitalist development peacefully. In fact, this latest event shows a remarkable similarity with the first such event of the post-colonial state, which happened in the early 1950s.

Changing global context and the post-war state

The current global context is very different from what liberals expected when a neoliberal project began to dominate the world. Capitalist development under neoliberalism had a diverse impact on states. In some states there was capitalist growth, making them stronger. They have begun to challenge the existing balance of power at global and regional levels. In the history of global capitalism and territorial forms of power this has happened before. We are seeing a new manifestation of this. It is better to understand the current global context within a framework of global capitalism and major power conflicts. The security dimension of this has to be analysed both at global and regional levels.

Capitalist growth in China, with China becoming a state that can challenge the hegemony of the US, has been an important outcome of the period when the neoliberal political project dominated the world. There has also been capitalist growth in India, and India is asserting its power in the South Asia region. Both China and India are dominated by hegemonic nationalisms. They are driven by their own political, economic and strategic interests when dealing with other states.

The competition between major powers is having an impact on the global economic integration advocated by neoliberal capitalism. There have been significant shifts in the economic policy of the developed capitalist countries of the West. Ensuring the economic security of the state is being prioritised over promotion of globalisation. After a more right wing regime came into power in the US, protectionist policies have been strengthened. There has been a significant impact on foreign aid policies. The US has closed down USAID. Since foreign aid is always a part of the foreign policy of donor countries this was not surprising. The US is also undermining the international legal mechanisms that could be used to discipline the behaviour of states, some of which have existed since the Second World War. Globally, US imperialist ambitions, which were present even when the global neoliberal political project was dominant, have become much more prominent. There have been a number of military attacks led by the US on other states.

As usual in human society, there are victims of all these new developments. Capitalist growth has led to increasing economic inequality within many states. In some instances, the differential impact of capitalist growth has given rise to new forms of identity conflicts. This has happened even in developed capitalist countries. State formation conflicts continue to cost a significant number of human lives. Due to the impact of uneven development, conflicts, the collapse of states and environmental degradation have had diverse impacts on the socially marginalised. As a result, thousands are dying in the sea trying to get to countries where they believe they can have a better life. This is not unknown for Sri Lankans – in the middle of the armed conflict thousands of Tamil refugees sought asylum in developed capitalist countries. Today the asylum issue has become a major issue supporting the rise of far right parties in developed capitalist countries.

These changes in the global context have had an impact on the post-war state. I would like to point out how the strategic interests of three major powers are operating in relation to the post-war state. First, the imperialist power, the US, tried to get the state to sign two agreements – The Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) and the Status of Force Agreement (SOFA). Both were directly linked to US strategic interests. The ACSA was to facilitate combined military exercises and SOFA covered laws governing US military personnel within the territory of the state. SOFA sought to provide legal immunity for US military personnel from Sri Lankan laws. There was political opposition against signing these agreements and they could not go ahead.

The US also has an interest in Sri Lankan harbours. The US has been investing in the development of the West Terminal of the Colombo harbour, together with an Indian company. India has its own interests in Sri Lankan harbours. This began with investment in Trincomalee harbour. This interest of India has continued and the post-war state has signed new agreements on Trincomalee harbour with India. Colombo harbour is the other focus of investment by India.

China is the third major power interested in Sri Lankan harbours. Improved relations with China during the military operations to consolidate the centralised state resulted in the state agreeing with China to build a harbour and airport in Hambantota district. Hambantota Port incorporates the post-war state as a part of the Chinese Belt and Road strategy. The Port City Project in Colombo is the other example of the interest of China in Sri Lankan harbours.

The interest of major powers in Sri Lankan harbours in the current global context points to the importance of the location of the state in the Indian Ocean. This is a continuation of a historical trend from the period of Portuguese colonialism. A Portuguese map of Sri Lanka in the 17th century only shows harbours. Dutch maps during Dutch colonialism always depicted Dutch control of the coastline. For British colonialism the location of Sri Lanka in the Indian Ocean was important. The British maintained the presence of the Royal Navy in Trincomalee harbour until 1957. What we are seeing now is a continuation of the same trend in a context of global capitalism and major power conflicts. Many analysts point out that the Indian Ocean is becoming a strategically important area in the current global context. The spatial construction named as Indo-Pacific demonstrates this trend.

The post-war state has to manage its relations with major powers in the current global context. The impact of the debt crisis and increased price of oil due to conflicts in other parts of the world have made it difficult to ensure the economic security of the state. Understanding how the post-war state is trying to manage this, monitoring the type of agreements that the state is entering with other states for this purpose, and the impact of these policies on strategic state-society relations in state formation, should be a focus of research.

[1] See Lindberg J., Orjuela, C., Siemon Wezeman, S. and Akerstrom, L. (eds) (2011) Arms Trade with Sri Lanka – global business, local costs, Stockholm: Pax Editors.

[2] See Lunstead, J. (2006), Speech to the American Chamber of Commerce, 6 January, 

[3] United Nations (2011), Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Experts on Accountability in Sri Lanka, 31 March 2011.

[4] See De Mel, D. and A. De Silva (2012), ‘Sri Lanka’, in S. Kelegama (ed), Foreign Aid in South Asia: The Emerging Scenario, 163-196, New Delhi: Sage.

[5] Human Rights Watch (2018), Why Can’t We Go Home? Military Occupation of Land in Sri Lanka.

[6] Centre for Policy Alternatives (2024), Intersectional Trends in Land Conflict in Sri Lanka, August.

[7] See Department of Census and Statistics (2019), Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2019.

[8] See Department of Census and Statistics (2019), Household Income and Expenditure Survey 2019.